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State v. Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 25, 112 P.3d 1070 (06/09/2005).1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 The State of Nevada convicted David Robert Riker (“Riker”) for murder.  Riker filed two 
sets of post-conviction petitions for the writ of habeas corpus—one in 1998 and one in 2004.  
The district court denied the 1998 petition, but granted the 2004 petition and an evidentiary 
hearing.  The State of Nevada petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or 
prohibition arguing that Riker’s habeas corpus claims are procedurally barred and that the district 
court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting a hearing.  The Nevada Supreme Court agreed in part 
with the State and ordered the district court to apply the appropriate procedural rules to Riker’s 
claims.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In November 1995, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riker’s conviction and death 
penalty sentence for the murder of Kevin Marble.  Riker then filed several post-conviction 
petitions for the writ of habeas corpus.  The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada 
(“district court”) denied Riker’s first post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
January 1998.  In March 2003, Riker filed a second post conviction habeas petition in district 
court.  The State moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the law procedurally barred Riker’s 
petition.  In 2004, Riker filed a motion for leave to conduct discovery, an amended habeas 
petition, and a motion for a protective order to keep his responses to the State’s discovery 
requests under seal.  The State opposed each one of these filings.  In September 2004, the district 
court issued an order granting Riker’s motions and granted Riker an evidentiary hearing.  The 
State petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition contending 
that Riker’s claims are procedurally barred and that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in 
ordering an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the claims.   
 
Issue 
 
 The issue is “whether Riker’s claims are procedurally barred” and whether the “district 
court abused its discretion in not considering the applicable procedural default rules to decide 
this question.”2 
 
Disposition 
  
 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the State’s request for a writ of mandamus and 
directed the district court to vacate the order granting Riker’s motions.  The writ also directed the 
district court to “consider and apply the appropriate rules of procedural default to Riker’s 
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2 State v. Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 25, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005). 
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claims.”3  The Court specifically stated that “if the district court concludes that all the claims are 
barred, it shall issue its order as a final one” and “if it concludes that any claims are not barred, it 
shall conduct further proceedings in this matter as appropriate.”4 
 
Commentary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court emphasizes in this opinion that writs of mandamus and 
prohibition are “extraordinary remed[ies]” and are not “means for routine correction and error.”5  
Accordingly, the Court set forth guidelines for when writs of mandamus and prohibition are 
appropriate remedies regarding post-conviction procedural bars.  
 First, the Court may issue a writ of mandamus “to compel the performance of an act 
which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control a manifest 
abuse of arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.”6  The Court may issue a writ of 
prohibition to “arrest the proceedings of any tribunal exercising judicial functions in excess of its 
jurisdiction.”7  The Court has discretion to issue these writs and considers “judicial economy” 
and “sound judicial administration.”8 
 Second, the Nevada Revised Statutes provides mandatory procedural default rules to 
post-conviction habeas petitions.  NRS 34.726(1) states “absent a showing of good cause for 
delay, a petition challenging the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within one year 
after this court issues its remittitur on direct appeal.”9  Pursuant to NRS 34.810(1)(a), if 
petitioner’s conviction was upon a guilty plea and the guilty plea was not involuntarily or 
unknowingly entered without effective assistance of counsel, then the court must dismiss the 
post-conviction habeas conviction.10  NRS 34.810(2) requires the court to dismiss a second 
petition if the petition “fails to allege new or different grounds for relief.”11 
 Third, NRS 34.800(1) permits a court to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the 
delay in filing prejudices the State.12  If the period of delay exceeds five years, there is a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State. 
 Thus in order for a petitioner to succeed on a second post-conviction habeas claim that 
surpasses the one-year filing period, the petitioner must do the following: 
1. Show good cause for the delay in filing by demonstrating that the delay was not 
petitioner’s fault and that the dismissal of this petition will unduly prejudice him. 
2. “[P]lead and prove specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present 
claims before or for presenting claims again and actual prejudice.”13 
 
                                                 
3 Id. at 1082. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1072. 
6 Id. at 1074. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1075. 
12 Id. However, NEV. REV. STAT. 34.800(1) provides an exception: If petitioner “‘shows that the petition is based 
upon grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence’ before the 
prejudice arose” the court does not have to dismiss the claim.  Id.  
13 Id. 
 3
Petitioner demonstrates “good cause” when he demonstrates “that an impediment external to 
the defense prevented him from complying with procedural rules.”14  Petitioner demonstrates 
“actual prejudice” when he shows that errors at his trial “worked to his actual and substantial 
disadvantage [by] infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions,” not that the 
errors merely created the possibility of prejudice.15 
 
Effect of Riker on Current Law 
 
 Prior to this case, the Nevada Supreme Court received an increasing number of petitions 
seeking intervention in post-conviction proceedings.  This decision will not affect the current law 
in Nevada because it does not change the law in Nevada.  This case only provides guidance to 
the State in determining when it should file writs of mandamus and prohibition for post-
conviction petitions, thus decreasing the number of petitions the Court receives.  
 
Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The Court did not look to law in other jurisdictions because the Nevada Revised Statutes 
specifically addresses the procedural default rules regarding the filing of post-conviction 
petitions. 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
 This case does not leave any glaring unanswered questions.  One does wonder, however, 
how much effect this case will have on reducing unnecessary writs of mandamus and prohibition 
for the Court.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Riker is a case that provides guidance for the State, petitioners, and district court judges.  
First, this case provides the State with guidelines on when it should use the extraordinary remedy 
of a writ of mandamus or prohibition to deal with post-conviction filings.  Second, petitioners 
now know the burden of proof they must show when filing a delayed writ for habeas corpus.  
Finally, the district court judges know they are required to apply the Nevada Revised Statutes 
procedural rules to post-conviction proceedings and have no discretion in the matter. 
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